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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we study the link between the employment rate (the employed 
proportion of the working age population) and output growth. We find that 
this relationship differs significantly across a sample of 11 OECD 
countries over the last 30 years. Output elasticities of the employment 
rate are found to be highest in the US, Canada, and the UK, and lowest in 
Japan and Austria. We also find that this elasticity is affected by some 
structural and institutional features, like the share of agriculture in 
output, the level of firing costs, the degree of inter-union and inter-firm 
coordination, and the percentage of employees in large firms. 

1. Introduction 
Persistently high unemployment has become a fact of life in many 
European countries since the early 1980s. In 1994, the average unemployment 
rate in the European Union (EU) was nearly 12%, six times the average in 
the mid-1960s. Unemployment rates were much lower in Japan (3%) and even in 
the United States (6%), where they have shown few signs of trending upward 
(see Figure 1 for a' sample of countries). Europe's jobless dilemma appears 
even more serious when one looks at employment to population ratios: the 
proportion of males aged 25 to 54 who are employed in the EU has fallen 
steadily during the last three decades, from over 95 % in the 1960s to 
around 80% today (OECD, 1994). At the same time, the ratio for females has 
increased more slowly than elsewhere in the OECD. As a result, total 
employment to working age population ratios throughout Europe are presently 
10 to 20 percentage points lower than in other OECD countries such as Japan 
or the United States (see Figure 2). This suggests that unemployment 
statistics -high as they may seem- actually understate the extent of 
Europe's employment problems. 
These disparities in unemployment performance across the OECD are 
commonly attributed to differences in employment growth paths., North 
America has been creating jobs to the tune of 1.8% per year since 1960 and 
Japan at a comparable rate of 1.2%. In contrast, annual employment growth 
in the EU has been a dismal 0.3% (OECD, 1994). This poor employment 
performance has induced European governments to focus on the so-called 
employment intensity of growth, i.e. by how much does employment change 
when output changes. The European Commission's recent White Paper on 
Growth, Competitiveness, Employment (a.k.a. the Delors Report) is a clear 
example of this concern (European Commission, 1994). 
Policymakers' concerns over the employment intensity of growth, 
however, are usually dismissed by academics, who point out -correctly- that 
the so-called employment intensity measure is simply the inverse of labour 
productivity. In this sense, the other side to Europe's weak employment 
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perfonnance (vis-a-vis the United States) has been far superior 
productivity growth. Faster productivity growth has been reflected in 
faster-increasing real wages (and presumably rising standards of living) 
for Europe's workers. The natural corollary of this line of thought is that 
the output-employment link is irrelevant. 
However, from a policymaker's perspective, neither an exclusive focus 
on the employment intensity of growth nor an exclusive focus on 
productivity growth appears warranted. Achieving a 'greater employment 
intensity of growth at the expense of reducing productivity growth does not 
seem desirable. But faster productivity growth -and hence real wage growth­
for only a shrinking fraction of the population -that employed- does not 
appear desirable either. To see why, consider the following simple 
exercise: assume that the policymaker's objective is to try to maximise 
output per person. Leaving distributional issues aside for a moment, this 
is akin to maximising the sl ice of output that corresponds to each 
individual. Increases in output per person would in this context be 
welfare-improving. Expressing output per person as the product of output 
per employed person (i.e., productivity) and the employment to population 
ratio -"employment rate" for short- is straightforward: 
--::-
o:::.u:::tp""u:::t,-- = -::o_O:::.u;::
tp",u:::t,--_ , Employment 
Population Employment Population 
(I) 
This decomposition makes it obvious that augmenting output per 
employed worker is not necessarily welfare-enhancing if it comes at the 
expense of reducing the employment rate. Figures 3 and 4 present the 
evolution of output per employed person and output per working age person 
across six OECD countries'! They show that the United States' poor 
perfonnance in tenns of labour productivity growth is much less dismal when 
measured in tenns of output per person of working age. On the contrary, the 
1 Hereafter we shall refer to working age population, which is a more 
meaningful concept, from an economic point of view. Its evolution over time 
is very similar to that of total population. 
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performance of high-productivity growth EU countries such as the United 
Kingdom or Spain appears significantly less rosy. The latter's impressive 
growth in labour productivity, for example, has been accompanied by a sharp 
drop in the employment rate, so that growth in output per person has been 
nearly a third smaller. A striking conclusion from these figures is that 
the evolution of output per person has varied much less across countries 
than has productivity growth. Only Japan appears to have consistently 
outperformed the rest of the OECD on both measures. It has managed to 
increase productivity growth without reducing its employment rate. 
On the basis of the above discussion, we argue that it makes sense for 
policymakers to care about the link between growth and employment, but 
suggest that a more meaningful way to think of employment performance is in 
terms of what happens to employment rates rather than employment levels. 
From the policymaker's perspective, maximising the fraction of' the 
potentially economically active population that is employed appears as a 
clear policy objective. Also, the employment rate is closely related to the 
unemployment rate, being equal to the product of one minus the unemployment 
rate times the participation rate:2 
E I t t - Employment _ Labour force - Unemployed Labour force mp oymen ra e- - , 
Population Labour torce PopulaUon 
= (1 - Unemployment rate) , Participation rate (2) 
So, by examlntng the employment rate, we encompass two rates that are 
linked to economic activity and that usually concern policymakers. 
The relevant policy question is how to raise the employment rate 
without sacrificing productivity growth. This paper makes a first attempt 
at exploring this issue by analyzing what affects the relationship between 
employment rates and output growth across the OECD. 
2 Our notation differs from that of other authors, who define the 
employment rate simply as one minus the unemployment rate. 
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We begin by establishing some stylised facts regarding employment 
rates across the DECO. We then proceed to explore the relation between 
those rates and output growth in the OECD. First, we look at whether this 
relation differs across a sample of 11 countries (Section 2). We then 
examine whether the policy measures commonly advocated for reducing 
European unemployment rates would also affect the output-employment rate 
link (Section 3). We find that this link does actually differ significantly 
from country to country. We also find that it is affected by only a small 
subsample of institutional characteristics of the economy related to those 
unemployment policy measures. The implications of our analysis for economic 
policy are contained in Section 4. 
2. Are employment rates related to output growth? 
2.1. Stylised facts 
Our first objective is to document whether there is a relation between 
the employment rate and the rate of growth of output. We start with some 
basic stylised facts. Table 1 presents average growth rates and employment 
rates for our sample of OECD countries from 1970 to 1992. It shows that the 
behaviour of employment rates over the period has varied significantly more 
across countries than has output growth. There is, at first sight, no 
apparent cross-country correlation between the two variables. Countries 
with similar average growth performance, such as Australia and Spain, for 
example, nevertheless manifest diverging trends in employment rates. In 
particular, while the employment rate has remained more or less stable in 
the former country, it has declined dramatically in the latter, to yield 
the lowest employment rate in all of the OECD. 
Going a step further and examining year-to-year changes in output 
versus changes in the employment rate yields a more consistent pattern. 
This pattern is shown in Figure 5 for all 11 countries and 22 years in our 
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sample. There is a clear positive relation between changes in output and 
changes in the employment rate: the raw correlation between the two 
variables is 0.57 (with a standard deviation of 0.025). Though suggestive, 
this fact is not all that useful for understanding the relationship between 
the employment rate and growth. It does not tell us, among other things, 
whether the relationship varies across countries or over time, nor does it 
provide any insights as to whether it is affected by technology, economic 
structure or institutions. To investigate these issues we first proceed to 
analyze the link between the employment rate and output growth separately 
for each country. This allows us to estimate country-specific output 
elasticities of the employment rate, i.e. what percentage of growth of the 
employment rate is associated with one percentage point of increase in 
output. We then return to the pooling of cross-country and time-series data 
to investigate what determines the variation in those elasticities. 
2.2. Estimating country-specific output elasticities of the employment rate 
While there has been little analysis of the relation between the 
employment rate and output growth, there is a long tradition of examining 
the relation between the unemployment rate and output growth. This is 
usually called "Okun's law" (from Okun, 1970), and it associates deviations 
of output from its trend growth path with fluctuations in the opposite 
direction of the unemployment rate around its equilibrium value. This is a 
relatively stable empirical relationship. Our focus on the employment rate 
in this paper generalises the usual Okun's law analysis: we implicitly 
include the labour participation rate and do not restrict the analysis to 
changes in output of a solely cyclical nature.3 
The employment rate can be expected to depend on many institutional 
characteristics in a given country. We will not try to account for such 
determinants, but try only to examine how the employment rate is related to 
3 Note that taking deviations of output from a linear trend in the usual 
way would not yield a cyclical component if output is nonstationary, as 
seems likely. 
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economic activity. Therefore, we allow for the trend change in the 
employment rate to differ by country, and then estimate an empirical link 
between changes in the employment rate and changes in output, other things 
equal. The relationship we estimate is: 
Change in Employment rate = a + b, Change in Output (3) 
where a and b are the coefficients to be estimated. a captures the trend 
change and b the output-employment link. 
This relationship is estimated separately for each country using 
quarterly data over the 1960:1 to 1993:4 period. As a measure of the 
employment rate, we use total civilian employment divided by working age 
population (those aged 15 to 64). As the output variable, we use real gross 
domestic product (GDP) in domestic currency. 4 Given the quarterly 
frequency, we allow for several lags of the employment rate and output to 
enter our estimated equation and then measure the relationship via a 
summary, long-run coefficient. 5 
Table 2 presents the estimated long-run output elasticity for each 
country -again, the percentage change of the employment rate associated 
4 Sample periods by country and data sources and definitions are presented 
in the Appendix. 
5 More precisely, we estimate the following equation: 
where ER denotes the employment rate, GDP the gross domestic product, t the 
period (quarter), u a random disturbance, and the remaining letters the 
coefficients to be estimated. l!. is the first difference operator (i.e. 
l!.Xt=xfXt_1)' Note that this equation is simply a reparametrization of the 
equation in first differences, directly yielding the size of the long-run 
elasticity as the value of the ratio h/(l-c). 
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with one percentage point increase in output-. For simplicity, details on 
the estimation procedure and on diagnostic statistics are presented at the 
bottom of the table, rather than here. 
The results show that the output-employment rate elasticity varies 
significantly across countries, from a low of 0.098 for Japan to a high of 
0.574 for the United Kingdom. In general, the Anglo-Saxon countries 
-Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States- have the 
higbest output elasticities, although Spain also shows a relatively high 
coefficient. On the contrary, employment rates in continental Europe -as 
represented by Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Norway- appear to be 
less responsive to changes in output. 
The "employment threshold" rate -a parameter which is often the 
concern of policymakers- can be computed directly from the estimated link 
between output and the employment rate.6 In our framework, this parameter 
is the minimum growth rate of output that is needed for the employment rate 
to remain constant (so that if output grows by less, the employment rate 
falls). Employment threshold estimates are displayed, in annual terms, in 
the second column of Table 2 and in Figure 6. The meaning of these 
threshold values is easy to understand by comparing them with the actual 
numbers in Table 1. For example, France's output growth was slightly above 
its threshold value, and so it managed to raise its employment rate 
slightly, while Spain's output growth was significantly below its 
threshold, so that its employment rate fell strongly. ? 
The estimated threshold rates convey two other interesting messages. 
The first one is that Anglo-Saxon countries tend to have lower employment 
6 It is calculated as the product of (minus) the constant in the regression 
times the inverse of the coefficient measuring the relationship between 
output and the employment rate (i.e., coefficient h in footnote 5), and 
then converted into annual frequency. 
7 The numbers do not exactly coincide because the sample periods used in 
the estimation differ from the period in Table 1. 
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rate threshold values. However, several EU countries -especially Germany­
also show low values. The worst performers are Spain, Japan and Italy. The 
second message is that these threshold values are larger than those usually 
found to be needed in order to achieve a constant unemployment rate. This 
is because of the observed downward trend in the participation rate in most 
countries (recall expression (2) above). This is another way to convey the 
idea that it may be harder to achieve a higher employment rate than to 
lower the unemployment rate. 
3. Explaining cross-country variation in the output-employment rate link 
3.1. Does the output-employment rate link differ significantly across 
countries? 
The results presented in Table 2 confirm that the employment rate 
intensity of growth varies significantly across countries, even within the 
OECD. In this section we formally test for this hypothesis and analyze 
whether these differences can be explained as a function of differences in 
product market structure, wage bargaining structure, and other variables 
which are often associated with labour market performance. This exercise 
allows us to examine whether the policy measures commonly advocated for 
reducing unemployment rates would also have an effect on the output­
employment rate link. 
We begin by estimating a common regression for our panel of 11 OECD 
countries. Estimating a single equation for the whole group of countries 
allows us to exploit the existence of both cross-country and time-series 
variation in the data, and lays the fouridation for our subsequent analysis 
of the effects of economic structure and institutions. There is,' of course, 
a tradeoff in that the fit of the equation for a particular country is 
likely to be worse than in the individual equations. 
Table 3 presents our estimates of the long-run output elasticities of 
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the employment rate. Our estimates allow for the coefficients of interest 
(namely, those capturing the long-run relationship) to be country­
specific.8 Because we impose a common dynamic structure on all countries, 
this set of estimates reveals significantly less cross-country variance 
than those obtained from the individual regressions. The single most 
important result from this table is that we can formally reject the 
hypothesis that the elasticity is the same across countries. Our estimates 
range from a low of 0.21 for Japan to a high of 0.49 for Germany. 
3.2. What affects the employment rate intensity of growth? 
In themselves, these results are not all that interesting, but they do 
serve rwo useful purposes. First, they confirm that, as suggested by the 
individual regressions, the sensitivity of employment rates to output 
varies across countries. Second, they provide the starting point for our 
analysis of how cross-country differences in structural and institutional 
variables affect the link between output and employment rates. Our next 
step is to introduce a set of variables that can help us explain cross­
country differences in the output coefficients. 
Our approach is straightforward: we simply estimate a new version of 
our panel equation in which we interact the output and employment terms 
with country-specific parameters that may proxy for the relevant structural 
variables.9 The choice of these variables is difficult and necessarily 
8 This is done by interacting the employment and output coefficients with 
country dummies. We also allow for country-specific constant terms and for 
seasonal dummies. 
9 We now estimate the following equation: 
2 2 2 2 IIERt= c(1+KPE.)IIER·t 1 + dll ER·t 1 + ell ER·t 2+ fll ER·t 3+ gil GOP·t I I 1- 1- 1- 1- 1 
G 
. . 2 2 2 +h(I+MPY.)1I OP·t 1 +JII GOP·t 1 +kll GOP·t 2+mll GOP·t 3+u·t I 1- 1- 1- 1- 1 
where subindex i denotes countries, PE and PY are, respectively, 
employment-related and output related variables, and K and M are their 
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arbitrary. Here, we opt for following the patterns set by previous studies, 
most notably by Layard et al. (1991) in their empirical study of the 
determinants of unemployment across the OECD. Our reason for this is 
simple: the variables they choose are the ones commonly considered to 
affect both price and wage setting in the economy, and hence unemployment.10 
By using these variables we test whether they are also useful in explaining 
the relationship between the employment rate and output. 
Note that the long-run elasticity depends on both the employment rate 
inertia (i.e., the relationship between the employment rate at different 
points in time), and the direct output-employment rate relationship. The 
structural variables may affect both, one of them, or none. To be sure, we 
always entered them as potentially affecting both, and allowed the 
empirical results to tell us whether each structural variable had a 
significant effect or not. 
After some trials, we limited the variables affecting employment 
inertia to two. One is a composite index of firing costs measuring both the 
size of mandated severance payments and requirements of advance notice. 
Higher firing costs should imply greater inertia of employment, and hence 
of the employment rate. The other is a measure of coordination between 
labour unions. Presumably, greater inter-union coordination should induce 
wage negotiators to intemalise the aggregate effects of their actions 
better, and should reduce employment inertia. 
The interactions with the output term are meant to capture the effects 
of economic structure and the wage bargaining system. The simplest 
specification (column I of Table 4) includes only two variables: the 
average yearly change in the participation of agriculture in total output 
respective vectors of coefficients. We again allow for country-specific 
constant terms and for seasonal dummies. 
10 See the Appendix for sources and definitions of these variables. 
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and the degree of inter-union coordination. A second specification 
substirutes the inter-union coordination measure for a more general measure 
capruring the degree of coordination between both unions and employers 
(column 2). Finally, a third specification includes the inter-union 
coordination variable and the percentage of employees in manufacruring 
working in large firms. The second variable acts as an additional proxy for 
coordination in bargaining (column 3). Both variables are also included as 
determinants of employment rate inertia in columns (2) and (3). 
Table 4 presents the estimates obtained from this set of regressions. 
Consider first the results from the simplest specification (column 1). The 
coefficient on the interaction of the employment rate with firing costs is 
positive and significant. This suggests that, as anticipated, higher firing 
costs increase the degree of employment rate inertia and thus reduce the 
output elasticity. The interaction of union coordination with the 
employment rate is negative and significant, indicating that higher union 
coordination reduces employment inertia. 
Turning to the interactions with output, we find that the variation in 
the proportion of agriculrural output always has a positive and significant 
coefficient. This suggests that those countries with the largest decreases 
in the proportion of output coming from agriculrure tend to have lower 
output elasticities.!1 This result makes sense if, as seems likely, these 
countries had high proportions 
agriculrure at the beginning 
of their labour force under -employed in 
of the period. 12 Finally, inter-union 
coordination appears to have a negative impact on the output coefficient, 
which is sensible if such coordination is allowing workers to extract 
higher wages when output increases, at the expense of expanding employment. 
The opposite signs on the union coordination variable in the interactions 
11 This variable is negative in all cases except for the United Kingdom. 
12 It should be noted that the change in agriculrural output was not 
significant at all when entered as a determinant of employment rate 
inertia. Also, firing costs were never significant when entered as a 
determinant of the contemporaneous output-employment link. 
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with employment. and output can be easily reconciled if one supposes that 
union coordination allows for asymmetric responses to increases and 
decreases in output: more coordinated unions are better placed to take into 
account the negative effects of wage increases on employment during 
downturns, but also more able to translate higher output into higher wages 
during upturns. This is consistent with most so-called insider-outsider 
models of union behaviour (see, e.g., Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). 
The results for the other two specifications are quite similar. The 
general coordination measure behaves much like the union coordination 
variable, although with somewhat muted effects. The percentage of employees 
in large firms variable has an extremely small, albeit significant, effect 
on both the employment and output coefficients. 
The estimated interaction terms allow us to calculate country-specific 
output-employment rate elasticities that are directly comparable to those 
obtained in Tables 2 and 3. This is done in Table 5. Since all sets of 
estimates are similar, we present only the results corresponding to our 
simplest specification (column 1 of Table 4). These results suggest several 
conclusions. First, the estimates fall easily within the ranges calculated 
using the country dummies in Table 3. In this sense, the structural 
variables used in that specification appear to capture the relevant cross­
country differences well. Second, output elasticities are higher -Le. 
employment rates are more closely linked to changes in output- in the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, countries with relatively 
flexible labour markets. Output elasticities are lowest in Japan and 
Austria, where clearly the evolution of employment rates are influenced by 
other factors. 13 
13 In addition to these interaction terms, we also tried other potentially 
relevant variables. These were the following (see definitions in the 
Appendix): measures of openness of the economy and real profits per 
employee (to capture the degree of competition in the product market); the 
percentage of employees in firms with less than 100 people; measures of 
corporatism, union density, and strike activity; the unemployment benefits 
duration and replacement ratio; and a measure of expenditures on active 
labour market policies. None of them showed a significant effect. 
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In order to analyze what factors seem to be influencing the output­
employment rate link the most in different countries, we have simply 
decomposed the country-specific elasticities into the components due to 
each of the structural parameters. We find that the biggest differences 
between the high elasticity countries and those with lower elasticities lie 
in their different degrees of employment rate inertia. This contrasts with 
the fact that the coefficients on output alone are significantly more 
similar across countries. In turn, in explaining differences in employment 
rate inertia, firing costs appear to be the main factor. Among the low 
elasticity countries -including most of continental Europe and Japan­
greater union coordination than in the rest of the OECD tends to work in 
favor of lower employment rate inertia, but this is more than offset by 
higher firing costs. The extreme cases in this regard appear to be Italy, 
Spain and Norway, which have the highest levels of firing costs and, in 
consequence, the highest employment rate inertia attributable to that 
factor. 
4_ Conclusions and policy implications 
The current situation of persistently' high unemployment rates in 
Europe appears more acute if measured by the employment rate, i.e. the 
employed proportion . of the working age population. This rate is 
significantly lower in European countries than in the United States or 
Japan. 
The employment rate is of interest to policy for several reasons. 
First, the employment rate is a more general measure of labour market 
performance than the unemployment rate, since it encompasses the behaviour 
of labour force participation. Second, a higher employment rate is 
conducive to a more egalitarian distribution of productivity increases 
across the population. This paper has argued that, for these two reasons, 
it is of interest to study the behaviour of the employment rate. 
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The paper flrst examined the link between the employment rate and 
output growth in a sample of 11 OECD countries and found it to differ 
signiflcantly across countries. The paper then analyzed whether country­
speciflc characteristics helped explain the differences. The results 
suggest that some structural and institutional features do indeed affect 
the link between output growth and the employment rate. 
Let us now focus on the policy implications of the latter analysis. 
Assigning a normative interpretation to our ranking of output elasticities 
is risky. Even if raising the employment rate is accepted as a policy goal 
worth pursuing, raising the employment rate intensity of growth would imply 
a more pronounced cyclical response of the employment rate. The latter is 
likely to entail a welfare cost that would have to be traded off for a 
higher medium-term employment rate. 
What do our results imply with regard to the usual policy 
prescriptions to reduce unemployment? The main conclusion is that measures 
to reduce firing costs -an often-heard recommendation against unemployment­
are also likely to have a signiflcant positive impact on the employment 
rate. A reduction in flring costs increases the response of employment 
growth to output growth, and hence what we have cal1ed the employment rate 
intensity of growth. 
The influence of the wage bargaining structure is harder to interpret 
in terms of policy recommendations. The results suggest that higher inter­
union coordination reduces the employment rate response to output growth. 
However, the results also indicate that, control1ing for the influence of 
firing restrictions, greater union coordination lowers employment rate 
inertia. The jOint evidence on bargaining structure and firing costs 
suggests that to achieve a stronger link between the employment rate and 
output, some degree of union coordination combined with reduced insider 
bargaining power may be desirable. 
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Lastly, we have not been able to find any evidence that other policy 
measures often advocated to reduce unemployment -such as increasing the 
degree of competition in product markets, reducing the generosity of 
unemployment benefits, or augmenting expenditures on active labour market 
policies- influence the link between output growth and the employment rate 
in a significant way. 
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Appendix. Database description and some statistical results 
A.!, Time series variables 
* Nominal GDP, Public consumption, Exports, Imports, Value added in 
manufacturing and in agriculture, and their respective deflators: OECD, 
Quarterly National Accounts, and, for Spain, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica, Contabilidad Nacional de Espafill. 
* Employment and Consumer price index: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, and, 
for Spain, Banco de Espaiia, Boletin Estadistico; 
* Money (Ml or M2), and Nominal exchange rate: IMF, International Financial 
Statistics. 
A.2. Sources for structural parameters 
* Real profits per employee in common currency: Average over 1960-1990, 
from OECD, National Accounts. 
* From Layard et al. (1991, pp. 51-52 and 420) (see this reference for 
original sources) (Those authors' abbreviation between parentheses): 
- Firing costs: Number of months' salary given to workers as severance pay 
after 10 years of service (SEV) plus Number of months' notice required 
after 10 years of service (NOT). 
- Extent of inter-union and inter-firm co-ordination, both formal and 
informal, in the process of wage-bargaining, going from 1 to 3 (UNCD and 
EMCD, respectively). 
- Percentage of employees in manufacturing wbo work in firms that employ 
more than 500 people (PLF) and less than 100 people (PSF). 
Corporatism: Calmfors and Drifill's ranking of the degree of 
centralization of wage bargains, original and adjusted on the basis that 
low degrees of centralization are better for economic performance than 
middle-range levels (CORP and CORP'). 
- Union density (1965-77) (UN). 
- Normalised strike indicators for the 1950s (SH1) and 1960s (SH2). 
- Unemployment benefit duration: duration for which benefits continue at a 
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reasonable level, in months; indefinite duration = 48 months (BD). 
- Replacement ratio: Percentage unemployment benefit replacement rates 
(RR). 
- Expenditures on active labour market programs per unemployed person as a 
percentage of output per person (LMP). 
A.3. Description of sample period covered by country 
The sample periods were determined by availability of relevant data series: 
United States (1964:1-1992:4), Germany (1968:1-1992:4), Canada (1960:1-
1992:4), France (1970:1-1992:4), Italy (1972:1-1992:4), Japan (1965:1-
1992:4), United Kingdom (1963:1-1992:4), Spain (1970:1-.1992:4), Australia 
(1969:2-1992:4), Norway (1970:1-1993:2), Austria (1969:1-1993:1). 
A.4. Diagnostic tests for Table 2 
Country 
United States 
Germany 
Canada 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
Spain 
Australia 
Norway 
Austria 
Sargan test 
3.07 
6.78 
2.51 
1.93 
3.92 
1.98 
1.23 
5.35 
4.68 
4.83 
2.99 
LM4 Test 
0.71 (0.59) 
2.43 (0.05) 
0.33 (0.85) 
0.83 (0.51) 
1.69 (0.16) 
4.31 (0.01) 
0.70 (0.58) 
1.22 (0.31) 
0.70 (0.59) 
2.74 (0.04) 
0.79 (0.53) 
Note: (a) Sargan test: test for the validity of the 
InStrument set (distributed as a chi-square with p-k 
degrees of freedom, where p is the number of instruments 
and k the number of estimated parameters. The relevant 
critical value is: chi-square(4) =9.49. (b) LM4: Lagrange 
multiplier test for up to fourth-order autocorrelation of 
the residuals (p-value in parentheses). The Sargan test 
is not rejected in any of our regressions, indicating 
that the set of instruments is not invalid. Similarly, 
the LM test indicates that there is no sign of serial 
correlation in any of the regressions except those for 
Japan and Norway. 
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Table 1 
Employment rates and output, 1970-1992 (Xl 
Employment rate 
Country 1970 1992 
United States 62.2 70.9 
Germany 57.9 61. 7 
Canada 59.9 67.3 
France 50.6 51.6 
Italy 55.9 54.6 
Japan 70.7 73.2 
United Kingdom 69.9 69.0 
Spain 58.5 47.5 
Australia 67.6 67.5 
Norway 59.2 64.4 
Austria 64.9 68.8 
Source: see the Appendix. 
Change in 
employment 
rate 
1970-1992 
8.7 
3.8 
7.4 
1.0 
-1. 3 
2.5 
-0.9 
-11. 1 
-0.1 
5.2 
3.7 
Average 
annual output 
growth rate 
1970-1992 
2.6 
2.4 
3.3 
2.5 
2.7 
3.8 
1.9 
3.0 
3.0 
3.5 
2.6 
Notes: Germany refers to the former West Germany. The employment 
rate is defined as civilian employment divided by the population 
of 15 to 64 years old. 
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Table 2 
Individual country estimates of long-run output elasticities 
of the employment rate 
Country 
United States 
Germany 
Canada 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
Spain 
Australia 
Norway 
Austria 
Output elasticity 
0.413 
0.344 
0.446 
0.318 
0.105 
0.098 
0.574 
0.442 
0.513 
0.249 
0.181 
Output 
growth 
threshold 
(%) 
2.08 
1. 84 
3.12 
2.57 
4.24 
4.55 
2:49 
4.67 
3.42 
2.50 
1. 63 
Note: The coefficients are derived from individual country 
equations. The equation includes a constant term and 
seasonal dUmmies. The estimation is carried out using 
instrumental variables. The instruments for the current 
change in output include the contemporaneous values of the 
deviation of world trade from trend, the change in the 
terms of trade, the change in the real money stock, the 
change in real· value added in manufacturing and the 
deviation of government expenditure from trend. 
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Table 3 
Long-run output elasticities of the employment rate 
from regressions with country-dummy interactions 
Country Output elasticity 
United States 0.418 
Germany 0.492 
Canada 0.446 
France 0.300 
Italy 0.320 
Japan 0.213 
United Kingdom 0.428 
Spain 0.458 
Australia 0.347 
Norway 0.223 
Austria 0.231 
Note: Computed from panel version of regressions in 
Table 2, in which coefficients on lagged changes in 
output and employment rate are allowed to differ by 
country. 10 country dummies are interacted with 
each of the two variables (the United States dummy 
is left outl, Estimated using instrumental 
variables (see Table 2 for details), 
Diagnostic tests: Sargan test of validity of the 
instruments=O.88 (critical value=9.491. F-test for 
joint significance of the 10 country dummies on 
lagged employment=5.51; F-test for joint 
significance of 10 country dummies on lagged 
output=6.07 (p-value=O.OO in the last two cases). 
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Table 4 
·Employment rate equations with interactions 
with country-specific variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Employment 0.411 0.378 0.597 
(4.37) (4.19) (4.40) 
x Firing costs 0.014 0.009 0.013 
(3.06) (2.254) (2.83) 
x Union coordination -0.240 -0.254 
(6.20) (6.45) 
x Union + Employer -0.112 
coordination (6.24) 
x Percentage of emplo- -0.004 
yees in large firms (1.91) 
Output 0.411 0.408 0.301 
(10.36) (10.73) (3.77) 
x Change in proportion 0.551 0.538 0.359 
of GDP in agriculture (6.37) (6.53) (2.28) 
x Union coordination -0.027 -0.031 
(2.12) (2.35) 
x Union + Employer -0.013 
coordination (2.19) 
x Percentage of emplo- 0.003 
yees in large (1. 58) 
Sargan test 2.16 1.87 1. 54 
Note: Panel regressions in which coefficients on lagged changes 
in output and the employment rate are interacted with the 
variables appearing below them. Estimated with instrumental 
variables (see Table 2). Absolute values of t-ratios in 
parentheses. Sargan test: test of the validity of the instrument 
set (critical value=9.49). 
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Table 5 
Long-run output elasticities of the employment rate 
Country Output elasticity 
United States 0.472 
Germany 0.338 
Canada 0.388 
France 0.345 
Italy 0.379 
Japan 0.233 
United Kingdom 0.475 
Spain 0.377 
Australia 0.318 
Norway 0.252 
Austria 0.245 
Note: Computed from estimates in column (1) of 
Table 4. 
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Figure 2. Employment rates 
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Figure 3. Output per employed person 
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Figure 4. Output per person of working age 
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